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Abstract 
In Hungary, several old trussed highway bridges of trough-type fell down because the 
vehicle passing through them was higher than permitted and got caught into the upper 
wind-bracing. The analysis shows that the trussed bridges where upper wind-bracing can 
be found only in the middle section of the bridge (the height of the trussed girder is varied) 
are liable to be destroyed by vehicles of a high load. 
Introduction 
In Hungary, for economic reasons there are a number of highway steel 
bridges which do not comply with all the traffic demands of the highway 
going through it, with respect to clearance gauge or the load-carrying ca-
pacity. In these cases, road signs located in front of the bridges draw the 
attention to the prescription that vehicles of what height or weight are 
permitted to run through them. However, it has been proved that the 
prohibition by road signs has generally not reached the required effect. 
In the last 20 years, several highway bridges were seriously damaged 
in Hungary, and four highway bridges collapsed completely because the 
vehicle was higher than permitted to pass through. The case of the bridge 
over the Hermid at village Gesztely is characteristic of the cases of collapse. 
There was an upper wind-bracing mounted on the middle section of the 
trough-type, trussed steel bridge of 46 m span built several decades ago. 
In October 1988, a lorry hauling an excavator was passing through the 
bridge. The jib of the excavator got caught in the first transverse wind-
bracing, and the bridge fell down by the effect of impact (Figs. 1 and 2). 
The estimated damage was 60 million forints. To clear up the causes of 
the catastrophe, an inquiry was ordered officially whose certain details or 
results, respectively, will be described in the following. 
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Fig. 1. 
Fig. 2. 
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On~§ite Inquiry and its Results 
Statements Made at the On-Site Inquiry 
In the course of the on-site inquiry held on the wrecks of the bridge over 
the Hernad at Gesztely, the following statements could be made: 
a) The coilapsed bridge was an old type trough structure, designed with 
the use of principles not applied any more in- today's practice, and 
constructed with riveted trussed main girders (Figs. 1 and 2). 
b) The accurate lifetime of the main girders of the bridge could not be 
determined by visual examination. It is sure that the main 
ers contained also such rolled profiles which were not manufactured 
arter the vVorld VVar II any more. 
c) The noor structure of the bridge was rebuilt in 1984. The noor struc-
ture (no or beams, the reinforced concrete noor slab, etc.) was in a 
faultless condition at the time of collapse and - according to the 
on-site inqui::y its condition could not cause the catastrophe. The 
damage to the welded longitudinal girders and the reinforced con-
crete slabs occurred at the time when the load-carrying capacity of 
the main girder ceased, and the bridge collapsed. 
d) The main girders of the bridge were subject to repair and repainting 
in the course or rebuilding of the floor structure. 
e) the time of the on-site inquiry, only the excavator was left behind 
on the bridge, by the lorry was hauled away in the meantime. The 
excavator could not be removed without demolishing the structure, 
because the structural material got entangled in the jib of it. It could 
be stated unambiguously that the jib got caught in the first transverse 
bracing of the upper wind brace and, as a result, the upper chord 'was 
contracted by the tensile force arisen in transverse bracing (Fig. 1). 
f) The expansion shoe of the collapsed bridge slid orr the abutment, and 
the bottom chord of the structure was lowered to the bottom of the 
river bed. 
g) The impact against the river bed bottom caused further damage to the 
structure. The bottom chord became crooked due to leaning on the 
river bed bottom, and so the upper chord, too, surrered deformation. 
Due to the distortion of the chords, some truss members underwent 
buckling. 
h) The excavator left behind on the bridge wrecks was damaged,. and 
the individual elements of it underwent well-observable, permanent 
deformation. 
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Reproduction of Failure Process 
On the basis of the experience gained from the on-site inquiry, the failure 
of the bridge can be summarized as follows: 
a) The lorry hauling an excavator entering the bridge from the direction 
of Miskolc (Onga) overpassed the cross-sectional area at the fourth 
post of the trussed main girder where the transverse bracing of the 
upper wind brace was laid out (Fig. 3a) while the jib of the trailed 
excavator got caught in this transverse bracing. By the effect of im-
pact, the transverse bracing deflected the upper chords of the main 
girder together with the posts assembled from their original plane 
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Fig. 3. 
b) The chords of the main girder deflected from their designed centre 
line - since a compressive force worked in them necessarily by the 
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effect of deadweight and the weight of the hauled vehicle - lost their 
load- carrying capacity (they underwent plastic buckling) and so did 
the posts, too. Consequently, the elements (bars) traced in dashed 
line in Fig. 3b did not work any more. This involved the consequence 
that, in this place, both the joint of the bottom chord, and the floor 
structure were overloaded, which - in turn - led to the development 
of a plastic hinge (as indicated in Fig. 3b). 
c) The structure becoming a kinematic chain (unstable bar chain) due 
to the plastic hinge collapsed slowly under the influence of the loading 
weights (deadweight, lorry, excavator), the girder end at the bearing-
support came off the abutment, and the section of the bottom chord 
to which a change in direction was brought about due to the plastic 
hinge was leaning on the bottom of the river bed (Fig. 3e). In this 
position, the structure as pieces of 2 two-support beams - was 
held in equilibrium. 
Exclusion of Other Causes of Failure 
Other Possible Causes of Failure 
If the experience gained from the on-site inquiry is disregarded, i. e. the 
fact that the collapsed bridge structure was in a well condition, and that 
the first transverse bracing of the upper wind-brace got entangled in the 
jib of the excavator - which undoubtedly proved the catch-in of the jib -, 
then as other causes of collapse, the following could have been mentioned: 
use of non-adequate material, or 
- overload or fatigue, respectively. 
Thus, examination of the causes mentioned above seemed reasonable. 
Testing of Materials 
Since the failure occurred at the main girders of the bridge, only their 
material was to be checked. 
According to the tests performed on the samples of the material cut 
out of the bridge wrecks, the used profiles were made of a high-grade open-
hearth steel (Martin steel) of grade 37. 
The results of the tensile tests and Charpy tests (impact tests) fully 
satisfied the requirements stipulated in the Hungarian standards. Con-
sequently, the cause of the failure could not be the insertion of a weak 
material liable to breakage. 
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Possibility of Overloading or Fatigue, Respectively 
The possibility of overloading was subject to examination by applying force-
theory calculations. The examination - since the road sign placed in front 
of the bridge indicated that the structure was classified as 'C' group with 
respect to dimensioning - covered, iu" addition to the load acting at the 
moment of collapse, also the case of load 'C' stipulated in the Hungarian 
standards. 
The deadweight of the structure - on the basis of the detailed analysis 
- as related to one main girder was: 
g = 23.65 kN/m, 
while the data of the vehicle passing through at the time of collapse, as 
well as the network of the main girder are shown in Fig. 4. 
The dynamic factor used in calculations according to the Hungarian 
specifications was: 
IL = 1.15 
in each case. 
According to force-theory calculations, the maximum calculated com-
pressive stress arisen in the upper chord No 3-5 of main importance with 
respect to the failure of the structure - if load 'C' is taken into consider-
ation - was yielded as: 
O'c = 6.39kN/cm2 , 
while in case the real vehicle was taken into consideration, it was yielded 
as: 
O'j = 4.70kN/cm2 . 
These stresses are essentially smaller than it could have been permitted 
for the given structure on the basis of the slenderness of the bar, or the 
rigidity of frame, respectively. Thus, e. g. the permissible stress for a bar 
of symbol 5-d on the basis of slenderness would have been: 
O'perm = 13.39kN/cm2 , 
while with the bar of symbol 3-d, the required frame rigidity in the case of 
reckoning with the load causing the collapse was yielded as: 
48 4.941 
Frequ . = av2 = 405.8.32 = 1 kN/cm, 
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Consequently, the failure of the bridge could not have occurred due to the 
loss of stability in the case of a normal service. 
The fatigue test of the structure seemed to be superfluous according 
to the stipulations of MSZ-07-3702. Since - according to the stipulations 
- the permissible stress for fatigue with a riveted structure will be: 
in the case of tension: () I,perm = 8.0 kN / cm 2 , 
in the case of compression: () I,perm = 13.3 kN / cm2 . 
However, at the same time, in the course of fatigue-test a smaller 
load should be reckoned with than in the course of stability test mentioned 
above. Consequently, it can be stated that the structure was not underdi-
mensioned with respect to fatigue (neither the on-site inquiry detected the 
signs of fatigue). 
Finally, it is worth pointing out the fact that according to the exam-
ination performed by means of calculation on the plastic hinge developed 
on the bottom chord, the moment effecting the development of the plas-
tic hinge and the ultimate moment - if the resistance of the floor beams 
and the reinforced concrete floor slab are also taken into consideration -
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were close to each other. In this way, the fracture occurred in the floor 
structure could be developed only relatively slowly consuming a little more 
time, which can be considered a favourable fact because the occurrence 
of an abrupt collapse could have endangered even the life of the driver. 
An abrupt collapse can be brought about only by a brittle fracture (rigid 
breakage) or a rapid loading greater at least by one order of magnitude 
than the ultimate moment. 
Analysis of Failure 
Kinematic Test of the Mechanism Developed During 
the Failure of the Structure 
Figs 5a and 5b show the top view of the structure in the state prior to 
failure, and its state during the failure process, respectively. 
In Fig. 5c, the side elevation of the structure (main girder) can be seen 
in the state prior to failure, and during the failure process, respectively. 
The geometrical data indicated in Fig. 5 (to, t, 11, 12, k, v, u, w, z) are 
correlated with each other. If the change in length of the elements is disre-
garded (elongation, compression), then the relationships can be determined 
relatively in a simple way, and the motion of the structure during failure 
(kinematics of the developed mechanism) can be described or examined 
mathematically. 
It is reasonable to examine the behaviour of the mechanism as a func-
tion of the vertical displacement (z) of the plastic hinge brought about on 
the bottom chord. The data calculated in this way are contained in Table 1 
and Fig. 6, respectively. 
The results obtained by means of the simplified kinematic model are 
in harmony with the state experienced during the on-site inquiry. Thus, 
e. g. the end towards the bearing support of the bridge had to fall from 
the abutment. 
Stability of the Chord in Compression in the Case of Transverse Force 
As it could be stated also in the course of the on-site inquiry, the jib of 
the trailed excavator got caught in the upper transverse bracing and, as a 
result, the contraction of the upper chords was brought about by a force Q 
(Fig. 1). It is problematic what magnitude of tensile force Qt could take 
an effect eliminating the resistance (load-carrying capacity) of the chord. 
At the instance of catch-in, a compressive force N = 941 kN was acting 
on upper chord 3-5, according to our calculations. In case this value, as 











well as the dimensions of the structure are taken into consideration, and 
an ideally elastic-plastic material is assumed, as well as a theory of the 
second-order is used, then the relationship between contracting force 'Q' 
and transverse displacement 'e' (in Fig. 5b, the displacement indicated by 
'v') can be determined for the two extreme cases, particularly with respect 
to: 
the chord of hinged support at both ends, or 
the hingeless chord, respectively. 










The results of the approximate calculations of this type performed 
by means of stability functions stipulated in MSZ 15024/4-85 are shown 
in Fig. 7. Since the reality is closer to the case of the clamped bar (the 
intermediate post, too, reinforces the chord to some extent, though it is not 
too considerable according to the numerical examinations), on the basis of 
Fig. 7, it can be accepted as an approximation that the stability of chord 
3-5 occurred by the effect of transverse tensile force: 
Qt = 260kN, 
and a lateral displacement: 
e = 6cm. 
With such deflection, the displacement of the upper transverse bracing 
designated by symbol 'u' in Fig, 5b (see also Fig. 6 and Table 1) will be: 
u = 58 cm. 
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Table 1 
Displacement of the kinematic chain of the structure in cm dimensions 
z u v to - t w 
0.1 54.06 5.2i 0.03 0.00 
95.14 16.66 0.34 0.00 
4 132,4.5 33.31 1.3i 0.01 
12 liO.16 5i.63 4.11 0.09 
20 190.00 i4.33 6.8i 0.24 
30 206.52 90.93 10.32 0.53 
50 22i.i4 lli.10 1 i.26 1.48 
iO 241.44 138.20 24.26 2.91 
100 255.08 164.54 34.86 5.94 
140 266.34 193.62 49.1 i 11.6.5 
200 2i5.39 229.39 i1.06 23.8.5 
260 2i9.22 2.59.06 93,46 40.50 
309 280.00 280.00 112.15 5i,46 
360 2i9.32 299,49 131.99 i8,45 
400 2i8.02 313.23 14i.82 9i.3i 
Energy Balance 
The analysis of failure raises the two fundamental questions: 
a) What was the speed of the vehicle bringing about the accident? 
b) In the given case, what a minimum vehicle speed should have been 
required to cause the collapse of the bridge? 
In connection with question a), no concrete answer can be given. The 
reason for it is the initial kinetic energy of the hauled vehicle having mass 
'm' and speed 'v': 
mv2 
Emin = -2-' 
from which speed 'v' could be re-calculated, cannot be determined. With 
this in view, one must know that kinetic energy is 'absorbed' by the steel 
structure at the moment of impact, i. e. the mass colliding against the 
structure performs a non-recoverable amount of work during slowing-down, 
inasmuch it will cause a permanent deformation, fracture or heating of 
the steel elements. However, in this case this amount of work cannot be 
re-calculated from the condition of the wrecks, because the deformations, 
fractures and displacements resulted not only from the force exerted by the 
impact of the vehicle but also from the collapse of the structure rendered 
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Fig. 7. 
could have been well occurred, e. g. that the vehicle would have already 
stopped after a stopping distance of 1 m at a structure similar to that dealt 
with above but supported steadily on a scaffold as opposed to the case 
examined where the stopping distance of 1 m was impossible because the 
instability discussed in point 4.2. would occur already after a distance 
u = O.580m, 
and the chords - independently from whether the vehicle has any more 
kinetic energy - will be contracted and let the vehicle run farther (the 
distance covered by the vehicle will be increased). 
The problem outlined above can also be illustrated on a very simple 
model. In Fig. 8 a hinged column loaded by force of gravity 'N' of a 
constant magnitude can be seen, which is going to be held vertically by a 
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spring below it. The characteristic curve is shown in Fig. 9 (it corresponds 
to the characteristic curve of an ideally elastic-plastic material model used 
commonly with the dimensioning of steel structures). If a horizontal force of 
magnitude' F' is acting on the top of the column and the spring resistance 
is sufficiently great, then the column rotated by angle K- will be restored 
into its state of equilibrium. In such a case - with every data assumed 
as known except of force' F' - the value of force' F' can be re-calculated 
by means of angle K- representing the motion of the column (the problem 
is unmistakable). If subsequently force' F' is increased gradually on, then 
at a critical force' Fer' and a hinge moment Mpl and angle K-er belonging 
to it, the column will be getting into motion (becomes unstable), and 'falls 
down' horizontally (K-=900). Of course, similarly a rotation by K-=90° will 
be the final result with each force: 
F ~ Fer, 
from which it can be inferred that there is an infinite number of forces' F' 
by the effect of which the column can fall down horizontally. Thus, in case 
K-=90° is observed - if force 'F' bringing about the final state is unknown 
for some reason - the actual value of'F' cannot be re-calculated (the prob-
lem is an undeterminate one). In a more simple case, the estimation of the 
force effect can be initiated from the measure of deterioration (permanent 
deformation, fracture) suffered by the structure rendered unstable. How-
ever, with the bridge examined here, it was impossible to evaluate reliably 
the damage suffered due to the fall-down of the bearing support. 
Fig. 8. 
From the foregoing it follows that in the given case answer could be given 
only for case b). 




/ Spring constant: c 
Fig. 9. 
The impact bringing about the collapse can be examined by the model 
shown in Fig. 10. Since this model disregards the development of plastic 
hinge (the joints of the trussed girders of vertical plane are assumed to 
be hinged ones - as it is accepted in the practice of statics), the results 
approximate the reality from below. Due to it, it is reasonable to take into 
account an increasing factor of 1.5 with the minimum speed yielded. 
F 
Fig. 10. 
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Otherwise, on the basis of those mentioned in the foregoing, the analysis of 
the unstable condition can take place by reckoning with the following data 
(See also Figs_ 5-1): 
Qt = 260kN 
m = f-L . mo = 1.15· 19460 = 22380 kg 
N = 941kN 
u = 0.58m 
e =0.06m 
(to - t) = 0.001 m 
k =5.88m 
The kinetic energy of the hauled vehicles prior to impact: 
Ekin = mv
2 
= 22380 . v 2 . 
2 2 
The approximate value of tensile force Qt acting on the chord is: 
Qt ~ 260 = Fk = F· 5.88 . 
4u 4·0.5 
Hence: 
F = 260· 4 . 0.58 = 103 kN . 
5.88 
Assuming that the heat output at the impact can be neglected, the change 
of kinetic energy Ekin will be equal to work L ext performed by the external 
forces. Since the state is examined when the impact is just bringing about 
the unstable state, the following equation will hold: 
D.Ekin = Ekin - 0 = Ekin = L ext . 
At the same time, the work performed in the system by the external forces 
will be: 
Lext = J Nds + J !du = 2·941· 0.001 + ~ . 103·0.58 = 47.0kNm. 
Consequently, the minimum speed bringing about the instability will be: 
J2Ekin ~ Vrnin = 1.5 --;;- = 1.5V 22.38 = 3.01 m/sec:::::: 11 km/h. 
Consequently, the calculations show that the vehicle with a trailer was pro-
ceeding along the bridge at least at a speed of 12 km/h when the jib of the 
excavator got caught in the upper transverse bracing. 
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Conclusions 
Before World War Il, the trussed steel bridges were constructed with main 
girders of varying height in most cases. With such structures - if they 
were of troughttype - upper wind brace could often be mounted only in 
the middle section of the opening. This layout involves the danger that 
the vehicles having a load higher than the permissible one will deteriorate 
the chord in compression of the main girder in the middle section of the 
opening, which, in turn, - according to the experiences and analyses -
can result in the collapse of the bridge even at a slow running speed (small 
impact force). With this taken into consideration, the following statements 
can be made: 
The mentioned structural layout is extremely dangerous, consequently 
it should not be applied to the new bridges. 
In front of the old bridges constructed with the structural layout men-
tioned above, railings of a steel structure (portal frames) should he 
mounted which will prevent the vehicles higher than permitted from 
driving on the bridge. 
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